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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA196, BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA196 2009-02-13 19:07 2011-02-11 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO2496
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0196/01 0441933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131933Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3566
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0292
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1564
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0023
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9099
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7285
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3551
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6094
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0864
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MNSA 
GENEVA FOR CD 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
USNATO FOR POL 
UESEU FOR POL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP PARM UNGA IAEA NPT BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 

REF: STATE 6970 

1. (C) SUMMARY. Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, to stressed that Brazil would like to see a consensus document come out of the 2010 Review Conference concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To avoid the failure of the 2005 RevCon, this time there must be a balanced approach, not just focused on nonproliferation, but also on the other two NPT pillars: disarmament and peaceful uses. While concerned about issues of noncompliance, universality of NPT membership, and discouraging withdrawals, Mourao had to balance the sovereignty concerns. He envisioned that Brazil will be expanding its enrichment and reprocessing capabilities as it became a major producer and supplier of nuclear fuel. Brazil is not looking to agree to an IAEA Additional Protocol and will oppose efforts to make it a universal requirement (absent carving out an exception for them). Detailed answers to the NPT questions raised in REFTEL are provided below. END SUMMARY. 

2. (C) On February 12, 2009, Environment, Science and Technology, and Health (ESTH) Counselor and Political Officer met with Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, to discuss issues concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in May of this year leading to the Review Conference (RevCon) in April-May 2010. Per REFTEL, EmbOffs raised the questions about the NPT per REFTEL. Mourao was expansive, and described at length his views about nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and disarmament. The answers to the NPT questions in REFTEL are provided below, keyed to the questions. SEPTEL will report on the other aspects of Mourao's remarks. 

3. (C) Answers keyed to REFTEL's NPT questions: 

QUESTION A. What are Brazil's objectives for the NPT in general, and for the current review process in particular? 

ANSWER A. Given the failure of the 2005 RevCon to agree on a Final Document, Mourao believed that the most important objective for this NPT review cycle would be to reach consensus on such a document this time around. While acknowledging that many problems remain from the previous cycle, Mourao saw reason for optimism because of what he termed "new approaches" to key NPT issues by key states, including the nuclear weapons states (NWS). In addition, Mourao believed that all three NPT pillars - disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses - should be addressed strengthened to "preserve the balance" of the Treaty. He said that in 2005 there was a lack of balance, with the majority of the attention on nonproliferation, while leaving disarmament and peaceful uses to the side. This imbalance, he opined, contributed to the failure to reach consensus. 

QUESTION B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Brazil hope to see from the United States? 

ANSWER B. Mourao believed that the most important step the United States could take at this point would be to join with the other NWS to reiterate their disarmament commitment contained in the Treaty. The NWS had done this in the past and he saw this as a prerequisite for any effort to reach a consensus. He also pointed to what he considered helpful USG signals on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) and potential agreement on a cutoff of production of fissile material as positive indicators for the PrepCon. While 

BRASILIA 00000196 002 OF 003 

Mourao noted the substantial progress made by the USG on dismantling weapons stockpiles, he stated that disarmament was more than reducing stockpiles. Revising defense policies to reduce the role of nuclear weapons is also a part of disarmament. He called attention to U.S. military doctrines that still allow for the use of nuclear weapons as undermining overall disarmament goals. 

QUESTION C. What does Brazil believe would represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters? 

ANSWER C. For Brazil, a consensus agreement that reaffirms the three pillars of the NPT is their desired outcome for this NPT cycle. He recognized the myriad of complex, sensitive issues involved and so was favoring something along the lines of a recommitment to principles together with an overarching framework that would provide a process for continuing the discussions. Brazil is prepared to work with the United States and other NPT members, particularly the "New Agenda" coalition - composed of Brazil, Sweden, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Egypt - to reach consensus on substantive issues at the RevCon. Mourao expressed his view that to gain consensus, the Final Document would have to be "balanced" and not just "Iran bashing." He also suggested that the NPT process could result in better management of what he termed "a proliferation of nonproliferation initiatives." Mourao made clear that reaching a consensus at the RevCon is critical for Brazil, far more important than concluding any particular substantive item. 

QUESTION D. Does Brazil believe that NPT parties should take action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what actions would it support? 
-- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North Korea. -- The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the Treaty. 
-- The lack of NPT universality. 
-- The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol. 
-- The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to additional countries. 
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. 
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. 
-- Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons forces and policies. 

ANSWER D. Noncompliance - Brazil shares the United States' concerns about the issues mentioned under this question but is not ready to endorse specific actions in response. As noted above, Mourao stressed that they did not want the RevCon to be an "Iran bashing" affair. Brazil believes that the review process should include discussion of noncompliance and these other issues, but longstanding Brazilian concerns about the primacy of national sovereignty remain strong. Mourao termed the issue of noncompliance "difficult" and supported continued coordination on Iran and North Korea to keep them within the NPT framework. He claimed that the U.S. agreement with India could weaken efforts to urge noncompliant states to comply, even though India is not a NPT member. Withdraw - Brazil has no answer to the question of what should be done in the case a state party withdraws form the Treaty and would prefer to work to avoid such a situation. He said that he supported 

BRASILIA 00000196 003 OF 003 

making it more difficult to leave or more attractive to stay in, especially if a country has benefited from cooperation and technology under the peaceful uses pillar. Nonetheless, at the same time, he concluded that a country was sovereign and would have the right to withdraw. Universality of NPT Membership- The lack of universality is an issue that is not likely to be solved, according to Mourao. Brazil supports outreach to non-NPT states but does not believe universal membership is achievable in the short term. He did not want to amend the NPT to allow them in because once the treaty was opened up for amendments the balance would be upset and all sorts of changes would be called for. In the long term, he could see that there might be something along the lines of an NPT Plus Three (Israel, India and Pakistan) structure. Universality of Safeguards and Additional Protocol - This is a very sensitive issue. Brazil's position is that at a minimum there should be no measure that requires explicitly or implicitly Brazil (and Argentina, is partner in the Quadpartite Agreement with the IAEA) to take on additional safeguard obligations. Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) Capabilities - With the expected massive expansion of nuclear power in South America and the rest of the world, Mourao said the current system of nuclear fuel supply and enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would have to change. He thought the RevCon could frame the issues, but wouldn't resolve them. He identified several options, such as having regional fuel suppliers (which would mean Brazil for South American), or an international system, or something else. He stressed that Brazil was determined to become self-sufficient in supplying nuclear fuel, which would involve significant expansion of its ENR capabilities. Mourao envisioned a Brazil-Argentine joint venture becoming the dominant the supplier for at least South America. Mourao said that Brazil had been willing to support an effort at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to require recipients of ENR technology to have an Additional Protocol in place (so long as Brazil and Argentina were understood to be grandfathered in through their inspection system). However, he was seeing internal reluctance to continuing support for that position. Peaceful Uses - The RevCon needs to look at promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, not just nonproliferation, according to Mourao. Disarmament and NWS Transparency - It is important that the RevCon address disarmament too, Mourao emphasized. He saw a need for the NWS to once more confirm their commitment to disarmament. He would like to see efforts to not just reduce numbers of weapons, but also revising military policies to reduce the role played by nuclear weapons. In support of disarmament and transparency, Brazil plans to propose a listing of steps toward disarmament taken by NPT members. This would include a range of activities, such as weapons reduction by the NWS and non-NWS dismantling of weapons programs or elimination of weapons, such as by Libya, South Africa, and Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 

SOBEL