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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI249, SLA UNITY SKEPTICAL ON DOHA, SEE UNIFICATION AS INCREASE OF MILITARY STRENGTH REF: A. KHARTOUM 372 B. DOHA 200 C. TRIPOLI 109 TRIPOLI 00000249 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI249 2009-03-25 09:09 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO9162
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0249/01 0840927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250927Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4647
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0155
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0025
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0164
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1443
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0173
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5174
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000249 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL AU SU KPKO LY
SUBJECT: SLA UNITY SKEPTICAL ON DOHA, SEE UNIFICATION AS INCREASE OF MILITARY STRENGTH REF: A. KHARTOUM 372 B. DOHA 200 C. TRIPOLI 109 TRIPOLI 00000249 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: Representatives of the Sudan Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction resident in Tripoli view the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" as a key step to folding smaller rebel factions into the SLA/U chain of command. In their view, the biggest gain is a consolidation of military assets and civilian support networks. Despite recent calls from the GOL to participate in the Doha process, they remain distrustful of Qatari intervention and discount UN/AU mediator Djibril Bossole's ability to serve as an unbiased facilitator due to his "friendship" with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim. Libya will help the new "Unity Plus" organize meetings with Darfuri civil society and camp leaders in Tripoli over the week of March 22, after which time SLA will determine whether to take the fight back to the field or participate in the peace process. End summary. "CHARTER OF TRIPOLI" UNITES GROUPS BUT DOESN'T MEAN THEY WILL GO TO DOHA

2.(C) In a March 21 meeting with Poloff in their room at the GOL-owned Hotel Kabiir, SLA/U representatives - Osman Busra, Saayid Sharif, and London-based Mahjoub Hussein - described the two-week-long conference in Tripoli attended by SLA/U, SLA/Khamis, URF, JEM/Idris Azraq, and SLA/Juba as an SLA/U initiative facilitated by Libyan hosts (ref A). The main point was to unite the factions to strengthen their military and negotiating positions, but, contrary to the Qatari readout (ref B), they stressed that they had made no commitment to negotiate with the GOS in Doha "or in any other place". Saying, "we will destroy Khalil," Sharif viewed unification as a chance to show the Darfurian people and the international community that SLA/U is the only "real movement". Deriding Ibrahim as an Islamist who had no support from the Darfurian people, Sharif assessed the importance placed on him by the Qataris and other international actors is due to a combination of media spotlight from Arab press like al-Jazeera and that "Khalil, the regime and Turabi are all playing together [on the same team] because they are Muslim brothers".

3.(C) While leaving open the possibility of joining future talks in Doha, SLA/U views Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud as uninformed of the real situation on the ground. Citing al-Mahmoud's trips to Chad and Darfur where he met with JEM but not SLA/U, Sharif claimed he has been poorly guided by UN/AU mediator Djibirl Bossole. Al-Mahmoud's presence at the signing of the "Charter of Tripoli" helped him learn more, but Busra still found his credibility in doubt saying, "if a man swears by Allah too much, he is a liar". Bossole, they claim, is biased toward Khalil Ibrahim and has lost credibility with other factions by focusing on JEM and ignoring movements that have support of Darfur's internally displaced people. Dismissing the framework agreement signed between JEM and the GOS in February, Hussein noted that "an agreement without the support of the people is a big zero". LIBYA ALLOWING SLA/U MORE FREEDOM WHILE PUSHING FOR DOHA

4.(C) All three representatives agreed that Libya's position on Darfur had changed since al-Qadhafi became Chairman of the African Union. Previously they enjoyed sanctuary in Tripoli but were forbidden from talking to the press. In the past month, however, they have given interviews to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Oya newspaper, al-Shababiya radio station, and al-Libya satellite channel. The biggest shift has been Libya's support of Doha as a venue for discussions. After quietly dismissing Qatari intervention from November 2008 to late February, Libyan officials began urging SLA/U to engage in the Doha process in early March. (Note: Qatari Emir Hamad visited Tripoli on March 5. End note). Despite Libya's new-found support for the Qatari initiative, Busra said Libya was a better venue for talks as field commanders and members of civil society could travel by car and there would be no chance of losing contact with military elements of the movement.

5.(C) Libya has also played the gracious host, allowing SLA/U to invite the groups to Tripoli with minimal GOL interference (Busra claimed that al-Mahmoud and Libyan FM Musa Kusa attended only the signing ceremony). They are also providing transportation and lodging for a number of Darfurian civil society members, IDP camp leaders, and military council supporters of the five joined movements to come to Tripoli TRIPOLI 00000249 002.2 OF 002 during the week of March 23 to decide on a name for the combined movement, appoint a leader, and decide whether to participate in a second Doha round of talks. However, Sharif said a cease fire would only be possible if the GOS met three conditions: immediately reverse the decision to expel NGOs from Darfur, allow no-fly zones over Sudan, and release all prisoners (military and civilian) that are members of the combined SLA movement.

6.(C//NF) Comment: While all three representatives consider the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" as significant, they seemed certain that they would not be going to Doha any time soon. They were much more interested in consolidating their gains: they claim continued success in bringing individual military commanders previously aligned with leaders like Minni Minnawi and Abdul Wahid Nur into their organization and are proud that their fighters stay in Darfur "with the support of the Darfurian people". In our meetings, they were nakedly attempting to win greater recognition for their movement and seem jealous of the attention paid to Minni Minnawi, Abdul Wahid, and Khalil Ibrahim by Darfur watchers. They spoke at length about their democratic institutions and support from the people while dismissing other leaders as autocrats intent on replacing the Bashir regime with their own - perhaps a gambit to win USG support for their movement. End comment. CRETZ